

RESEARCH TITLE

Political Repression and Islamist Moderation in Egypt and Morocco between 1990 and 2010

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Abstract

This thesis provides a critical analysis of the environment that the Islamists worked in, which affected their process of moderation testing the inclusion-moderation hypothesis by selecting two case studies, Al Wasat party in Egypt and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco. Many factors may affect the moderation process and it will be discussed. This thesis uses a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including personal interviews, media reports, documents, and expert analyses. It analyzes how the behaviors of the political regimes in both Egypt and Morocco can affect the moderation process positively/negatively, in addition, the role of the leaders of the Islamists which can play a vital role in this process, further the interaction between the internal and the external factors.

Key Words: Egypt, Morocco, Al Wasat part, the party of Justice and Development Party, moderation, and the Muslim Brotherhood

القمع السياسي والاعتدال الإسلامي في مصر والمغرب بين عامي 1990 و2010

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المستخلص

تقدم هذه الأطروحة تحليلاً نقدياً للبيئة التي عمل فيها الإسلاميون، والتي أثرت على عملية اعتدالهم باختبار فرضية الشمولية-الاعتدال من خلال اختيار دراستي حالة، حزب الوسط في مصر وحزب العدالة والتنمية في المغرب. قد تؤثر عوامل كثيرة على عملية الاعتدال وسيتم مناقشتها في هذه الورقة البحثية. تستخدم هذه الأطروحة مجموعة واسعة من المصادر الأولية والثانوية، بما في ذلك المقابلات الشخصية والتقارير الإعلامية والوثائق وتحليلات الخبراء. كما تتضمن تحليلاً لكيفية اسهام سلوكيات وسياسات النظامين السياسيين الحاكمين في كل من مصر والمغرب أن تؤثر على عملية الاعتدال إيجاباً أو سلباً، بالإضافة إلى دور قيادات الإسلاميين التي يمكن أن تلعب دوراً حيوياً في هذه العملية بالإضافة للتفاعل بين العوامل الداخلية والخارجية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: مصر، المغرب، حزب الوسط، حزب العدالة والتنمية، الاعتدال، الاخوان المسلمون.

1. Introduction

The rise of Islamists in the Middle East pushed many researchers to analyze and explain their mechanisms and ways of thinking because they have a great effect on the politics in the region. It would help analyze their relations with the political regimes, the other political wings, and their relations with societies. The researchers are classifying Islamists into moderates and radicals based on beliefs and behaviors. Such classification is important because there are many Islamist groups and they differ in ideologies, and methods of change. These classifications are debatable because the measures of classification vary from one researcher to another. Researchers like John Esposito, Graham Fuller, and Charles Kurzman categorize Islamists into moderate Islamists who believe in democracy, pluralism, and human rights such as Al-Nahdah in Tunisia and AK party in Turkey, and radicals who don't, like the Taliban and Al-Qaida (Wickham, 2004:206). Many reasons can push them to be radicals, including exclusion, torture, imprisonment, and more. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis will be used to explain the moderation process. This dissertation will explore the prospect and development of Islamist moderation in a political environment characterized by political repression, under an authoritarian regime, and the lack of opportunities to participate in elections, public debates, and decision-making institutions. In Egypt, it will focus on Al-Wasat party although it became moderated the Egyptian regime refused to give it a legal license excluding it from participation in political life, While in Morocco, it will focus on the Justice and Development Party (PJD) which became moderated and has been allowed by the regime to participate in the political arena. In which conditions the first has been refused, and in which conditions the second has been accepted, will be analyzed in this research. This chapter includes the thesis subject, the purpose of the thesis, its scope and content, the research question, and the importance of the thesis.

1.1 Thesis Subject

This dissertation will explore the prospect and development of Islamist moderation in a political environment characterized by political repression, under an authoritarian regime, and the lack of opportunities to participate in elections, public debates, and decision-making institutions. Two case studies will be analyzed, Al Wasat Party in Egypt and the PJD in Morocco. I chose these two case studies because both Egypt and Morocco have conservative societies (Hancock, 2017), authoritarian regimes, and many different Islamic trends, radicals, and moderates. There are similarities between the two case studies, Al-Wasat Party and the PJD split from a mother group, Al Wasat Party split from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the PJD split from the MUR. The difference between the two cases is the participation in the political life. Al Wasat wasn't allowed from the Egyptian regime to work, but the PJD after prohibiting, the Moroccan regime gave it a license, and these two different behaviors of the regimes affected the moderation process of the two parties. I will examine both of these political parties in the period between 1990 and 2010. The research uses primary resources through interviews with leaders and members of the movements discussed in this paper and their official media. The research uses secondary resources too such as articles, TV interviews, books ...etc.

1.2 The Purpose of the Thesis

Although Al Wasat party had applied three times to have a legal license to work in politics, the Egyptian regime refused these applications and didn't give it any opportunity to work officially. The PJD was allowed by the Moroccan regime to work after years of refusing and prohibiting and the PJD later led the government. So, what are the reasons that pushed the Egyptian regime to prohibit Al Wasat party? What are the reasons that pushed the Moroccan

regime to allow the PJD to work after prohibiting it? Can the behaviors of the regime be the only factor that determines the refusal or acceptance? Or the nature of the party and its ideologies and behaviors can play a role in making the regimes accept or refuse it? This thesis analyzes the interaction between a repressive political environment and the opportunities for Islamists to participate in politics to allow them to moderate. The research has one main question, what are the interactive dynamics between Islamist participation in politics and the environment in which they work?

1.3 The Scope and Content of the Thesis

This thesis will employ the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to examine the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and Morocco from 1990 until 2010. It will analyze the interaction between a repressive political environment and the opportunities for Islamists to participate in politics to allow them to moderate. In addition, it analyzes the factors that potentially moderate the Islamists, especially the radicals through the inclusion process. Many Islamist groups rose in the Middle East after the end of the Ottoman Empire hoping to get back the heritage of Al-Khilafah. Other factors helped the rise of such groups as colonialism and nationalism, and Islamist groups were as a counter defending against them. Some groups used violence from an ideological prospect to build an (Islamic State) and apply Shari'a and some radical groups refused to participate in political life. Some of these groups and other groups that didn't believe in violence as a method of change, both participated in elections and political life. They believed that participating in politics can make them gain and they can change through politics. The relation between religion and politics still occupies a great space in the thoughts of Islamic groups, it is an important point to understand the way of thinking of these groups the matter that can help understanding the moderation process. There are many hypotheses dedicated to analyzing moderation, such as inclusion and exclusion.

Many factors affect that transformation, the readiness of the Islamist groups to make use of the opportunities under the authoritarian regimes and their capability to develop their ideologies and behaviors to participate in politics. The internal revisions of these Islamic movements play a great role in this moderation process to have both ideological and behavioral change. On the opposite, the behaviors of the political regimes whether they have a real intention to merge the Islamists into the political life.

The inclusion process transition may face many problems and obstacles. In a region like the Middle East, it would be clear that authoritarian regimes are obstacles in sometimes against the moderation of Islamist parties, those regimes categorize the Islamists as a threat to their thrones. So, the oppression, the imprisonment, and the prohibiting are the main tools of the regimes to force them to keep out of the political path. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was prohibited from finding a political party (Ellis, 2011). The leaders and the members of the Brotherhood were facing oppression and prisoning from the regime of Mubarak. The exclusion forced them to cooperate with the other ideological parties.

If moderate Islamist groups became more moderate, and even radical groups became moderate, would wider society accept them and accept this transition? Rachid Ghannouchi realized that society in the 1970s didn't accept the movement when it was radical, he said "Islamist militants felt a sense of alienation from wider society" (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:865) After a long march to moderation, some political wings still accuse Ennahda as a radical group, in 2013, they accused it killing some political opposition members (Almonitor, 2013). Moderate Islamists are on the horns of a dilemma, they are being criticized by other radical groups and are not accepted by some groups of society.

The thesis is composed of four chapters, the first one is the introduction. The second will

discuss the history especially the separation of the Muslim Brotherhood, its program, its thoughts, and its moderation process with a mention of two of its leaders who affected the party. The third chapter will analyze the PJD history, the relationship between it and the regime, its thoughts, and its participation in the elections since its foundation until 2010, in addition to focusing on its moderation process with shedding light on two of its leaders. The fourth chapter will contain the findings and the conclusion of the thesis.

1.4 Research question

This study is going to answer one main question:

What are the interactive dynamics between political repression and Islamist moderation?

1.5 The Importance and Original Contribution of the Thesis Subject

The importance of this thesis comes from the case studies that will be discussed. Few scholars discussed Al Wasat Party and his experience hasn't been discussed enough from my point of view. To understand Al Wasat Party's experience, it is important to make a comparison with other experiences, so, I chose the PJD in Morocco which managed to participate in the different elections in Morocco since its foundation until now. The relationships between the two parties are opposite, while Al Wasat Party didn't have good relationships with the regime, the PJD had. In addition, it will be the first time to interview the leaders of Al-Wasat party after the military coup of 2013, the jail of the leaders of the party would change their ways of thinking and their points of view on many issues. The JPD is still in the political arena although the Islamists in other Middle East countries are facing a sharp wave of repression.

2. Literature review

2.1 Between Moderates and Radicals

There are many definitions to distinguish between moderates and radicals, moderates are those who seek gradual change by working under the legitimacy of the regime, while radicals seek to overthrow that regime. Moderates are those who accept the political tools as elections, while radicals refuse to use violence to achieve what they want. (Schwedler, 2013:5) once the authoritarian regimes block the roads against the moderates from participating in political life, they may become radicals. The moderates are being criticized for participation in political life and elections. Schwedler argues that " more extreme opposition groups challenge Islamists to prove their core commitment to a conservative religious political vision." (Schwedler, 2013:1)

2.2 Moderation, its causes, and indications

Schwedler defined moderation as " moderation entails a process of change that might be described as a movement along a continuum from radical to moderate, whereby a move away from more exclusionary practices ... equates to an increase in moderation (2013)."

Jillian Schwedler discussed the changes in the beliefs and practices of Islamists focusing on the reasons that may lead to this change. She suggests that one of the main reasons is their inclusion and participation in pluralist political processes and she discusses whether Islamists became more moderate due to that hypothesis (pp.348-349). Schwedler in other research defends inclusion against exclusion, she argues that exclusion forces political opposition groups to work underground in secret ways and manners. She argues that " one of the most important effects of political inclusion is that it creates strong incentives for various groups to cooperate, even if only at a tactical level." (Schwedler, 2013:5) Schwedler argues that three dimensions can demonstrate the effectiveness of inclusion, participation in elections, cooperating with ideological rivals, and the commitment of Islamists to inclusion signs of believing in pluralism (Schwedler, 2007:57). For elections, she argues that Islamic parties in

different Islamic countries participated in many elections and seized a great percentage of the seats, she mentioned many examples as the participation of Lebanon's Hizbullah, the Hamas victory of February 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and Yemen's Islamist Islah party (2007:58). She argues that participation in elections is not a sufficient indicator of moderation and that inclusion doesn't guarantee ideological moderation. She calls for a look at the discussion that happens within the party instead of observing the public statements to judge the inclusion process (2007:58).

Ihsan Yilmaz makes a comparison between the experiment of the Islamist parties in Turkey and Egypt especially those of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the Al-Wasat Party in Egypt. In the case of Egypt, he is explaining the reasons that stand behind allowing some political space to Islamists. The Egyptian regime used them as a scarecrow to frighten the other political wings passing the state of emergency and seizing more control. In addition, the regime used them to justify the repressive measures by declaring the state of emergency. Also, it creates a continuous dispute between the different ideological political wings to guarantee its control and prohibit any effort to unite all the political wings against it (2009, p.100). Yilmaz discusses the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the leaders of the Al-Wasat party as they come from inside the Brotherhood shedding light on the factors that lead to moderation. As an organizational factor, he argues that this generation which grew up in universities became leaders later in syndicates and members of the parliament. These experiences affected them extremely in accepting the tools of politics, especially the work with the other ideologies. He described their thoughts as "a secular-leaning and pluralist Islamic approach (2009:104). Yilmaz mentioned three arguments discussed by Wickham that may explain the moderation of the Islamists in Egypt. First, Islamists came to this point through a learning process and strategic calculations. Second, the repression that strengthened to include Islamists and Secularists forced them to work together and cooperate. Third, the institutional opportunities and incentives were created by a mix of regime accommodation and repression of the Islamists (2009:105-106). He mentioned throughout the whole article, in brief, the thoughts of the new generation of Islamists, this generation believes in the separation between politics and religion as a functional separation. They are open to others and believe in democracy, human rights, and political participation.

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham focuses on the birth of the Al-Wasat party, its thoughts, its differences with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the limits of its moderation process. Regarding the differences between Al-Wasat and the MB, she argues that while the Muslim Brotherhood believes that the Sharia is valid in all times and places, Al-Wasat defines the main and the general principles of the Sharia, it calls for more flexibility in interpretation and application. Another difference is that while the Muslim Brotherhood believes sovereignty belongs to God, Al-Wasat believes sovereignty belongs to the Ummah (nation). Thirdly, pluralism for Al-Wasat means political, cultural, social, and religious, while for the MB has a religious meaning as a creation of God (2004:209). She makes a comparison between the moderation process of the left in Europe and Latin America and that of the Al-Wasat party in Egypt. She argues that the participation of the Al-Wasat party generation in the syndicates while they were members of the MB contributed to that transformation. They were forced to deal with other ideological wings and serve all. They were traveling abroad working with others from different cultures and backgrounds, a matter that participated in the openness to others. Generally, she argues that Islamists may be forced to be moderated to seize opportunities in an authoritarian regime and to avoid more political constraints. She argues that they became moderate through political learning and strategic calculation (2004:211-213). Wickham sees Sharia as the source of legislation as a problematic issue in the thoughts of the Al-Wasat Party because from her point of view, who has the right to interpret Islamic law? She argues that the

interpretation of Al Wasat party of Sharia is problematic. Thirdly, although they became moderate, they are still avoiding using Western terminologies. This may explain the limits of moderation.

Wuthrich and Ciftci discuss intraparty dynamics such as organizational strength, social movement linkages, and ideological legacy as factors that may affect the moderation of Islamists. They argue that the behavioral and ideological change comes from two internal factors, the level of the centralization of power within the party and the nature of the institutional and ideological linkage with a social movement (2020:330). It means from their point of view that if the structure and the leadership of the party are strong, it will be moderated because the structure is centralized, and if the power of the authority within the party is not centralized, moderation will not be an easy process. They gave examples of the first case as the AK party in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia, while they mentioned the Islah party in Yemen and Malaysia's PAS as counterexamples (2020:330-333). They see that there is an obstacle to full power centralization in Islamic parties, the social movement linkages. They claim that the parties who have linkages with social movement organizations or had been founded by such organizations are less flexible to moderation compared to the others who don't have such a relation. They make a comparison between the split of the Al-Wasat Party in Egypt and the AK Party in Turkey.

Utvik in his article *Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism* published in 2007 focuses further on the formation of the generation that founded the Al-Wasat party. He gave importance to the environment that the leaders of the party were working in which played a great role in forming their thoughts and behaviors. He argues that the activities in the Egyptian universities in the 1970s and the 1980s participated in enriching the political capabilities and the openness to others of the leaders of this generation, in addition to their work in the different syndicates (Utvik, 2007:299). Further, through their positions in these syndicates, they had been affected by other Islamic political parties in other countries such as Turkey, Tunisia, and Algeria, (2007:301). They learned from them with their different experiences and this helped in developing their ideologies and behaviors. Many Islamic thinkers and writers affected their mentality such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi, Tariq al-Bishri, Muhammad Salim al-Awa, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Muhammad Imara. Those thinkers were the intellectual background of the party and its cultural organization *Jam'iyyat Misr Lil-Thaqafa Wal-Hiwar* (2007:301-302). Founding this organization was an attempt to have any official existence after the refusal of their party license. The conflict between this generation and the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood in many visions and opinions in addition to their total domination forced them to take another way apart from the main group (2007:300). Utvik also discussed the program of the Al-Wasat party concentrating on his thoughts about the role of women in public and political life, the role of the family in society, the principles of Sharia as the main source of legislation, and many other points.

Amr Hamzawy (2005) argues that moderate Islamists in many countries such as the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party became more democratic and more pragmatic. Hamzawy noticed that the USA and Europe have the willingness to engage them less ideologically. But in another place in the same article cleared that " Arab regimes have long secured the support or at least the silent approval of the United States and Europe for their repressive measures toward Islamist movements by evoking the so-called Algerian syndrome or the nightmare of anti-western fanatics coming to power through the ballot box (2005). So, the USA and Europe are satisfied with the oppression of the Islamists in the Middle East committed by the authoritarian regime.

That means the USA and Europe aren't serious about containing and empowering the moderates. They don't make a distinction between those who are moderate and those who are radicals and extremists.

Hatina concentrated on describing the differences between the thoughts of Al-Wasat and those of the Muslim Brotherhood. He argues that Al-Wasat leaders were calling for a civic state, equality between Muslims and Coptics, respect for the constitution and the authority, condemning terrorism, the defense of freedom of belief and opinion, and working on building a dialogue between the state and the Islamic trend (Hatina, 2010:174). Hatina –as proof of moderation and a different thought of the Muslim Brotherhood- mentioned that Al-Wasat made a connection with the Egyptian left (Hatina, 2010:176) He argues that Al-Wasat confessed the sovereignty of the people, empowering the women to participate in both public and political life. Hatina briefly discussed the Muslim Brotherhood's campaigns against Al-Wasat party's founding, in addition to the refusal of the Egyptian government to give its leaders a legal license as a political party.

2.3 The relation between religion and politics

Wegner and Pellicer argue that al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) -which merged with others and became the MUR in 1996 and later many leaders of it formed the PJD-transformed since the mid-1980s. The leaders condemned the violence as a means of change in politics, accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy, and exercised democracy in the internal structures. The PJD was founded in 1998 by the MUR to have a separate political branch. Although MUR founded the party, gradually the party started to create its path away from MUR. A step that aimed to separate the politics from Dawa. While PJD was interested in politics, MUR was interested in Dawa, the relationship was a partnership. (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009:160-161) there were clashes between PJD and MUR. For example, in 2002, the PJD supported the Moroccan personal status code (family laws), while MUR opposed it and opposed the abolition of polygamy and the right of women to arrange marriages without a 'marital tutor'. The protests of MUR were against the secularization of society as they thought (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009:164). Wegner and Pellicer said, "In sum, any possible effect of the PJD's moderation on democratization was canceled out by its increase in strength that was threatening the regime" (2009:169). The separation between politics and Dawah and the separation between the party and movement is a key factor of such moderation.

2.4 Between the internal and the external factors

The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (JDP) separated from Shabiba Islamiyya which opposed the monarchy and has been oppressed. As a result of oppression, it went to work underground. Spiegel argues that once the separation happened, there was a new generation who believed in politics and democracy, this generation participated in elections confessing the legitimacy of the monarchy. (2015:5-6)

Spiegel argues that there was a change in the thoughts of the leaders of JDP, their speeches changed from religion to focusing on combatting corruption, concentrating on economics, and not opposing the monarchy but working under its umbrella. (Spiegel, 2015: 4-5) He argues that the party became more moderate in its behaviors and speeches. He explains that this change was motivated by three reasons, firstly, the monarchy allowed it to participate in politics with limits and red lines. Secondly, the party controlled the other allied movements such as ("haraka") and controlled its internal organizations. Thirdly, the competition with other parties and movements such as Al Adl. (Spiegel, 2015: 2-3) According to this analysis, the moderation process succeeded due to internal and external factors.

2.5 Moderation through Exclusion

Besides inclusion, there is exclusion which means excluding Islamists from participating in political life, in addition to oppressing them by prohibiting their activities and imprisoning them. Cavatorta and Merone discussed exclusion as a tool of moderation giving the Tunisian Ennahda movement as a case study. They defined it as " However, exclusion can be also defined more broadly to include the social rejection of political projects that are perceived to be alien to mainstream society, which can reinforce and to a certain extent underpin and legitimize state's repression." (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:859) The writers argue that Ennahda suffered from double exclusion, from the state and large sectors of society, and that pushed the movement to be more moderate. They said "it may appear that the repressive campaign and the imprisonment of the leadership pushed the party towards greater moderation. It is for instance in jail in the early 1980s that Rachid Ghannouchi produced the theoretical work that is now the pillar of the attitudes and policy positions of the party concerning public freedoms in the direction of cementing democracy as the only viable political system." (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:868)

3. The Research Method of the Thesis

This study is going to adopt a qualitative method for the data collection. In this thesis, to find out the gap in this area in the previous literature. This data will be analyzed to fill up the gap using primary sources such as interviews with political leaders, the documents, statements, and announcements of the politicians of these groups, and the official media of these groups. The interviews are going to be with Abu Elela Mady, the founder of the Al-Wasat party he is out of jail contrary to the majority of the party leaders who are now in jail like Essam Sultan, and Atef Awwad, one of its leaders and one of the founders and the responsible of the documentation and legalization of the party due to his career as a lawyer and he is free, so, it would be easy reach both of them. The paper applies some of the concepts of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and the factors that can affect the moderation process such as party leadership which means centralization of power or hierarchical structures can lead to moderation, interaction with different groups in a pluralist system leads to 'political learning', cross-ideological cooperation between Islamists and other groups, behavioral moderation, ideological moderation, understanding the relation between politics and religion.

4. Conclusion

This thesis explored the prospect and development of Islamist moderation in a political environment characterized by political repression, under an authoritarian regime, and the lack of opportunities to participate in elections, public debates, and decision-making institutions. The inclusion moderation hypothesis has been used to understand the experiences of the Islamists in two countries, Egypt and Morocco choosing two case studies, Al Wasat Party in Egypt and the PJD in Morocco. The behaviors of the political regimes in both countries were different and affected the moderation process. While the Egyptian regime didn't give the party an official license to work, the Moroccan one allowed the PJD to work allowing it even to form the government after winning the majority in the elections.

To examine the success of moderation, measures have been applied such as participation in elections, cooperation with others, and whether Islamists show signs of moderation as a result of their experiences of inclusion. These are behavioral changes, but also ideological changes have been applied to examine both two case studies. In addition, the thesis analyzed the factors that affect the moderation process such as the institutional opportunities and incentives, political learning, learning from other Islamists in other countries, the mentality of the leaders of the Islamists, intraparty dynamics, and the interaction between the internal and external factors.

In chapter two, Al Wasat party is analyzed exploring its history and the circumstances of its

birth and foundation. The process of moderation of the party didn't start after the foundation but before. The leaders of the party such as Aboeela Madi, Essam Sultan, Atef Awwad, and others have been members of the Muslim Brotherhood since they were students in the universities. They were active in politics in the university campus and later when they became leaders in professional syndicates and candidates in the parliament elections. Due to their openness to the other political powers during their activities in syndicates, they learned to cooperate with other political wings, and they learned from other Islamists in Turkey for example. They went into a dispute with the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood. This dispute was due to differences in visions and thoughts, the new generation was more open to others and had the ambition to work officially not underground, in addition, there was a gap between the two generations in issues such as the participation of women in political life, the rights of the Christians, separation between politics and Dawa, and other issues. The old guard had another vision.

The new generation was forced to leave the Brotherhood forming Al Wasat Party, such a step was opposed by both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime which refused the license of the party three times. The refusal had many reasons, there were suspicions that it was an arm of the Brotherhood and that step was a hidden plan of the Brotherhood's agenda. A wing of the Egyptian regime was afraid of the party because this wing was marketing itself as a moderate one against the Muslim Brotherhood, so, accepting Al Wasat party could be a threat to their plans. The program of the party wasn't affected only by the thoughts of its leaders, but also by many thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi, Tariq al-Bishri, Muhammad Salim al-Awa, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Muhammad Imara. Those thinkers were the intellectual background of the party and its cultural organization Jam'iyyat Misr Lil-Thaqafa Wal-Hiwar which was founded after the denial of the party's license. The program of the party was different from the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood. It gave more space to the freedoms that come before anything from their point of view. The party didn't refuse a Christian to be a candidate in the presidential elections. Relating to the role of women in political life, it didn't refuse that, it accepted its role and didn't mind being a candidate in any elections.

The party moderated itself to avoid the repression of the regime instead of radicalizing and using violence against it (2004: 213). Al Wasat Party is a good example to prove that Islamist movements and parties can moderate their ideologies under both inclusive and exclusive regimes" (Tallmeister, 2013:5).

Chapter Three analyzed the PJD and its moderation process. The leaders who founded the PJD were belonging to Islamic groups but they split from them refusing violence as a tool of political change. The Moroccan regime denied their request to establish a party, forcing them to cooperate with an existing official party. They participated in the elections of 1997 under the name of the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel (MPDC) led by Abdulkarim Khatib. Since this participation, they used to participate in elections but with the new party the PJD. The elections of 2016 were the greatest won in its history by gaining 125 seats in parliament.

To understand the behaviors of the regime with the PJD, it is important to understand the vision of the regime toward the religion. The Moroccan regime sees itself as the only protector of the religion and the king as Amiru Almominin. His decisions were under the name of Allah because his descendancy came from the Prophet Mohammed. This vision helped the inclusion of the PJD in politics because the regime didn't have any critical issues with religion like other countries in the Middle East. The regime allowed the PJD to work for many reasons, Huntington sees that the economic crisis in the 1980s pushed the regimes to

contain the Islamists. Accepting the Islamists as the PJD may encourage other Islamists like Al Adl movement -which doesn't confess the legitimacy of the regime- to participate in political life. One of the most important reasons that facilitated the inclusion of the PJD was its acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime and the readiness to work under its umbrella. The party didn't only accept its legitimacy but also defended it on many occasions.

The political inclusion of the PJD led to ideological changes which affected their visions in many political cases. The party believes in Islam as it covers all the aspects of personal and public life, but that doesn't mean it is without specialization, every Islamic association should be specialized in one issue and cooperate with others in a mode of integration. As an application to this change, the party separated itself from the MUR which represented the religious and social structure of the party. The separation between politics and Dawaa affected positively both of them. The leaders of the party didn't accept the domination of the MUR leaders on the party's affairs, and that was a great fact to make the separation succeed.

The party started to use more political words. Speeches such as the identity and the dispute of civilizations decreased, while speeches on political reform, social justice, and economic improvement increased. That was a result of the separation between politics and Dawaa.

The party was involved in issues like moral and religious issues, it was concerned about the Islamic subjects which were belonging to other countries. But gradually the party became concentrated on national issues. The party believes that there must be harmony between national, Islamic, and humanitarian dimensions, but the priority must be on the patriot one. The PJD showed liberal thought when accepted in 2005 Al Mudawwana (the code regulating marriage and family life in the country) although the refusal of conservative Islamists.

Until the year of 1986, the Islamists in Morocco weren't convinced of the role of women in public affairs, but the first step to empowering her was that year by organizing the first conference and establishing the Department of Women, this step was a translation of the writings of some Islamists scholars such as Al Karadawi and Mohamed Al Ghazali. The first party organization of women was established in 2010 and it is responsible for protecting the values of the family, raising the participation of women in politics and public affairs, and other missions and aims.

To conclude, the behaviors of the political regimes toward the Islamists play a vital role in the moderation of the Islamists. The experience of the PJD succeeded because the regime had a real intention of allowing the party to work officially even with limits. While in Egypt the regime wasn't a reason for the moderation of the party. Not only the behaviors of the regime responsible for the success of moderation but also the behaviors of the Islamists themselves. The readiness of the Islamists to participate in a political environment dominated by an authoritarian regime and the lack of opportunities to participate in elections, public debates, and decision-making institutions.

5. References

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